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Research Security at the National Science Foundation

Office of the Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy









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New update


On July 10, 2025, NSF issued an Important Notice (NSF IN-149) providing updates to NSF Research Security Policies, including: a research security training requirement, Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program annual certification requirement, prohibition on Confucius institutes and an updated FFDR reporting and submission timeline. Those policies are effective as of Dec. 2, 2025.











Research security at NSF: Why does it matter?


Securing the nation's research enterprise is part of the mission of the U.S. National Science Foundation and is essential to the national defense. NSF works closely on this effort with its funding agency counterparts and with the law enforcement and intelligence communities — consistently emphasizing the importance of balancing research security with international collaboration in science and engineering.

NSF has dedicated considerable effort and resources to working with the research community and its other partners to:

Equip researchers with the information and tools necessary to ensure that their work is protected.

Clarify security issues and mitigate risks.

Foster transparency, disclosure and other practices that reflect the values of research integrity.

NSF's effort has led to ongoing initiatives aimed at clarifying proposal preparation and award administration requirements, as well as the issuance of new policies and directives in the proposal and award process.













Case Studies



Case study 1: Failure to respond to an OIG subpoena related to foreign funding and affiliations 

An NSF-funded principal investigator is employed by a U.S. organization.

NSF's Office of Inspector General receives information, including open-source information, that the researcher participates in a foreign talent plan and serves as a faculty member at a foreign organization.

The PI does not disclose any information about foreign funding/affiliations in NSF proposals, even though that information is required by NSF's Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide.

NSF's Office of Inspector General issues a subpoena; the researcher produces some documents, including a partial application to a foreign talent program, but, according to the OIG, the documentation provided is insufficient.

On the OIG's recommendation, NSF suspends the PI's awards to the U.S. organization.

The researcher, although represented by counsel, resigns from the U.S. organization, and leaves the United States, but fails to fully respond to the subpoena.

On the OIG's recommendation, NSF imposes a government-wide debarment on the researcher (including a bar on serving as a reviewer, adviser or consultant) for a fixed term. This recommendation is in view of the researcher's failure to respond to the OIG's subpoena (for example, through court action contesting the subpoena or full production of documents) and in view of information indicating that the researcher failed to fully disclose current and pending support in proposals to NSF. At the end of the debarment period, NSF will consider the decision to determine if an extension is necessary to protect the public interest.

As the PI is no longer involved in the NSF-funded research, NSF lifts the suspension of the awards.

Outcome: While there were no formal proceedings instituted against the researcher in federal court, NSF took three types of actions — award suspension, debarment and lifting of award suspension — at different stages of the OIG's investigation. These actions were tailored to the risk to NSF in view of the information available at the time the action was taken. 



Case study 2: Failure to report extended absences and to respond to an OIG subpoena 

NSF's Office of Inspector General receives information that an abstract cites an NSF award for support but lists only authors from foreign organizations. One of the co-authors is the principal investigator for the cited award, which was made to a U.S. organization at which the PI is a faculty member.

Publicly available information indicates that, in succession over a brief period, the PI's proposal is funded, the PI is selected as a foreign talent plan participant, and the PI begins extended leave to visit family in a foreign country. The term of the extended leave corresponds to the time the PI is listed as having a foreign appointment.

During this same time, the PI also returns to the United States to serve as an NSF panelist.

The PI does not disclose foreign support or appointments to NSF or to their U.S. organization.  

The OIG subpoenas the PI for information about employment outside of the U.S. organization. The PI declines, citing restrictions by the PI's foreign employer.

Based on an OIG recommendation, NSF suspends the award. The organization agrees to terminate, while also returning the funds received after the PI went on leave.

On the OIG's recommendation, NSF also imposes a bar on the PI serving as an NSF reviewer, adviser or consultant.

Outcome: During the lifecycle of the OIG' s investigation, NSF and the organization took different actions to mitigate risk to NSF, including award suspension and termination, repayment of funds and imposition of a reviewer bar.



Case study 3: Grant fraud involving a foreign talent plan participant 

A professor at a U.S. organization founds a company that relies exclusively on federal grants to fund research, including NSF SBIR/STTR funding.

The professor/founder also begins working as a paid researcher at a foreign organization.

NSF's Office of Inspector General receives information that the company does not maintain records required to effectively administer the awards and that the awardee provided false information to NSF about its records systems.

Additional information developed by the Department of Justice and OIG indicates that the funded research had already been completed at the professor/founder's foreign organization.

As the investigation develops, NSF, on the OIG's recommendations, suspends awards, terminates awards, withholds final payment and reduces an award amount.

DOJ files a criminal complaint against the professor/founder.

Based on the OIG's recommendation, NSF imposes a government-wide suspension on the professor/founder and related companies.

Evidence is presented at trial indicating that grant funds obtained would be used for research the professor/founder knew had already been done overseas. The professor/founder intended to use the grant funds for other company projects rather than for the projects for which the funds were requested. To obstruct the investigation, the professor/founder submitted falsified timesheets to government investigators.

Information, including a talent plan contract, becomes available at trial that the professor/founder is a foreign talent plan participant.

DOJ prosecution results in criminal conviction of the professor/founder of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, three counts of making false statements and one count of obstruction by falsification.

Based on a recommendation by OIG after the professor/founder's conviction, NSF imposes government-wide debarment and a reviewer bar on the professor/founder and related company for a fixed period.

Outcome: During a multi-year investigation, NSF took several administrative actions well before filings in federal court, based on recommendations by the OIG. These included award suspensions, terminations, withholding the final payment/reduction of an award amount and government-wide suspensions. The investigation resulted in a criminal conviction. Thereafter, on the OIG's recommendation, NSF imposed a government-wide debarment in view of the risk to NSF and the professor/founder's lack of present responsibility.



Case study 4: NSF and a science association find research security and integrity violations 

A well-published senior researcher at a U.S.-based institution had four awards terminated, which had award funding totaling more than $1 million. During a thorough NSF Office of Inspector General investigation, it was found that the researcher had multiple undisclosed foreign affiliations in violation of NSF's disclosure policies. A scientific association that the researcher belongs to had also convened an independent panel to conduct an investigation based on complaints they received from other association members. 

The scientific association investigation found that the researcher violated the association's peer review process by repeatedly sharing reviewer names and individual scores connected with paper submissions to the association. Additionally, the researcher coerced a co-author to proceed with a manuscript submission to the association, despite the co-author's repeatedly expressed concerns about the correctness of the results reported in that manuscript.

Lastly, the researcher was part of a talent recruitment plan, which is itself allowable. However, the malign foreign government talent plan affiliation was not disclosed to NSF and there were terms in the talent plan contract that could be linked to both the nondisclosure issues and the concerning behaviors found by the association's investigation. The researcher has since resigned from the U.S. university and left the United States.



Learn more about NSF's research security goals



NSF's research security goals seek to:

Improve transparency and continue to clarify disclosure requirements.

Coordinate with U.S. government interagency partners to harmonize disclosure information to the extent practicable.

Communicate and build awareness with the scientific community.

Share knowledge and best practices.

Mitigate risk through assessment and analysis to better understand the scale and scope of research security threats.



SECURE Center and SECURE Analytics



SECURE (Safeguarding the Entire Community in the U.S. Research Ecosystem) Program

Safeguarding U.S. research security is paramount as some foreign entities continue to attempt to exploit American innovation unethically or even unlawfully. The U.S. National Science Foundation announced a five-year $67 million investment in establishing the Safeguarding the Entire Community of the U.S. Research Ecosystem (SECURE) Center.
View the press release.

Read about the individual awards:

SECURE Center (University of Washington)
SECURE Analytics (Texas A&M)



RSI-ISAO Solicitation 

Research Security and Integrity Information Sharing Analysis Organization (RSI-ISAO) Program Solicitation, NSF 23-613



RSI-ISAO Solicitation Webinar

Two identical webinars

Registration is required. Register Now!

When: Monday August 14, 2023 3:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time (US and Canada) and Thursday August 24, 2023 1:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time (US and Canada)

Topic: Research Security & Integrity Information Sharing Analysis Organization Solicitation (NSF 23-613)

After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the webinar.



RSI-ISAO Solicitation Webinar Recordings

August 14, 2023

Research Security and Integrity Information Sharing Analysis Organization (RSI-ISAO) Solicitation Webinar (NSF 23-613)

RSI-ISAO Solicitation Webinar Slides (PDF, 1.77 MB)

August 24, 2023

Research Security and Integrity Information Sharing Analysis Organization (RSI-ISAO) Solicitation Webinar (NSF 23-613)



RSI-ISAO Legislation

The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (Public Law No. 117-167, Title III, Subtitle D, Sec. 10338), requires the NSF Director to enter into an agreement with a “qualified independent organization” to establish the Research Security and Integrity Information Sharing Analysis Organization (RSI-ISAO). This organization will empower members of the research community to address foreign interference issues, support a security-informed decision-making structure, provide government officials with situational awareness, and offer the research community access to USG expertise. Importantly, the organization will offload some of the administrative workload from those it serves and empower them to utilize tools and other capabilities not typically available to them. 

The specific roles of the RSI-ISAO may be found at https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ167/PLAW-117publ167.pdf in Section 10338.

The agency is actively working to establish the RSI-ISAO in accordance with the requirement and in an effort to strengthen efforts to secure the national research security ecosystem.



RSI-ISAODCL

Dear Colleague Letter: A Request for Input on the Development of the U.S. Research Security and Integrity Information Sharing Analysis Organization 



RSI-ISAO DCL Webinar Recordings

May 18, 2023

Stakeholder Engagement on Research Security and Integrity Information Sharing Analysis Organization (RSI-ISAO)

May 24, 2023

Stakeholder Engagement on Research Security and Integrity Information Sharing Analysis Organization (RSI-ISAO)

RSI-ISAO Webinar Slides (PDF, 777.01 KB)





Research on Research Security Program (RoRS)



Research on Research Security Program (RoRS) 

NSF's new RoRS program supports interdisciplinary, evidence-based research to enhance understanding of security risks, practices and policies to safeguard the U.S. research enterprise and foster a strong academic field in research security.
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